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conomic development. The latter, however, may result in "simultaneous negotiations with two or more economically powerful states in competition with one another." A state that believes its power position is rising tends to assume a "narrow, rigid negotiating posture," while one that is "adjusting itself quickly to a relative reduction in power status" develops a "penchant for negotiation." American "cold warriors" should note his conclusion that: "Ideological beliefs of a country tend to have little influence on its demands and attitudes regarding matters of substance. Its assessment of its own best advantage in terms of material gains or military power, and the general protection and promotion of its other vital interests will predominantly determine its conduct." This does not answer the question whether the belief that ideology influences policy and good faith may not inhibit negotiation between states with different ideologies.

In the final chapters the author emphasizes the need, if negotiation is to succeed, for each party to be flexible, to be ready to moderate its initial position, and to recognize that its opponent must emerge without significant diminution of its international status. The party with the greater national interest and the greater power tends to be less flexible. Confidence of a negotiator that he has the support of the source of authority in his government, and his "personal qualities" . . . "his tact, energy, understanding, and sensitivity, as well as his capacity to engage in informal discussion—are of direct relevance to the success or failure of a negotiation."

In the last chapter, the author assesses the role of international law in relation to negotiations. He disagrees with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a judge on the International Court, that the interdiction of the use of force in the United Nations Charter "have had the ironic effect of weakening general respect for international law," a comment apparently made after frustration by the United Nations of the Franco-British attack on the Suez area in 1956. Lall believes that commitments to peaceful settlement have contributed to the success of negotiations, but the new states which had little influence on the development of

international law tend to believe that it does not in all respects protect their interests. This opinion and their underrepresentation on the World Court accounts, he thinks, for their general refusal to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The problem of bringing international law up to date, of persuading states, especially the great powers, that it is in their interest to observe their obligations under the Charter and to resort more frequently to the Court may increase respect for international law. "At present," however, "power, rather than respect for international law, continues to be a dominating factor in international relationships. At the same time there are certain slight indications of the opposite tendency."

This survey of some of Dr. Lall's general conclusions does little justice to the wealth of information which his book provides about the current negotiations in which he has participated and the attitudes of the principal states toward peaceful settlement of disputes. On Southeast Asia he notes: "The United States and the United Kingdom had not seen it possible in 1964 to agree to the calling of a negotiating conference, in spite of the wishes of France, India, China, the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, and the urgings of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." He later refers to the intransigent attitude of the United States and China after the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964, related to their respective beliefs in commitments to South and North Vietnam. On the Middle East, after noting the Arab and Israel positions in 1964, he says: "Thus we have two totally incompatible positions strongly adhered to and—together with other factors—making negotiation on the refugee question virtually impossible."

The book is notable for its objectivity, impartiality, and wisdom. The reader will learn from it much about the current state of the world, both in general and in detail, and also will profit by sage advice on what wise statesmanship and informed opinion might do to improve it.

*Quincy Wright is professor emeritus of international law, University of Chicago.*

**THE IDEA OF  
A WORLD  
UNIVERSITY**

By MICHAEL ZWEIG. Edited with a foreword by Harold Taylor. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. Pp. 204. \$7.00.

Reviewed by  
E. U. CONDON

If human civilization is to survive on this planet, there must be a not gradual, but urgently accelerated development of world cultural, educational, economic, and political institutions of all kinds, and an accompanying reduction of the power now exerted by the anarchy of national governments. These, despite fine pledges in the United Nations Charter which renounce war as an instrument of national policy, continue to spend upwards of \$120 billion a year on war and preparations for war.

Each nation justifies this enormous waste to its subjects by the claimed need to keep ahead of other nations. Every year these armaments are increasing the danger of a cataclysmic explosion of frightful proportions. Comparable effort, if devoted to constructive uses of peace, could go far toward solving those problems which give rise to war—or at least would dispose of the excuse most frequently advanced for not attacking them: "We can't afford it."

The United States alone is now spending close to \$3 billion a month for the war in Vietnam, a little country of 17 million people, as a result of steadily mounting escalations since our 1964 election. And the end of the increases is not in sight. Added to an already large military budget, total U.S. expenditures this year for war and preparations for war will be in excess of \$75 billion, about 10 per cent of the gross national product.

Thus, the expenditure, large as it is, is really not large compared to the to-

spirit of international law as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations in increasing their military confrontation on their common border," although "when China finally attacked India in October, 1962, it was departing violently from the new precepts of international law." He also points out that India (and the same was true of Pakistan) refused to negotiate on Kashmir when it thought it could maintain its position by power.

The author pays tribute to Great Britain for the voluntary emancipation of its colonies in the spirit of the self-determination of peoples called for by the Charter, in marked contrast to the efforts of the Netherlands, France, and Portugal to hold colonies by force. "The recent and present events in the Carribean, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the India-Pakistan border," he writes (and might have added, if he had written a year later, "in the Middle East"), "show that if there is an increasing respect for international law it is not having the effect of completely restraining states from using force."

A fourth mode of dealing with disputes and situations may be called "obsolescence," that is, doing nothing with the hope that the problem will in time fade away. However, according to Lall, "the longer a dispute or situation remains unnegotiated the greater the cumulative risk that it might become an occasion for the use of force." Armistice or cease-fire lines, unacceptable by the parties at each side as permanent boundaries, though maintained for a considerable period by a balance of power or by international policing forces, have not become converted into peaceful boundaries by the passage of time but have continued a threat to the peace unless a settlement is reached by negotiation. This process, the author points out, may take a long time, but wise statesmen should pursue it before being faced by a serious crisis.

If obsolescence does not work, dictation is forbidden, and adjudication is seldom accepted, negotiation must be the main tool for peaceful solution of international disputes and situations.

Of his 26 chapters, the author devotes five to the definition and essential ingredients of negotiation, four to

procedures and attitudes facilitating negotiation, 11 to factors inhibiting success, and six to ancillary factors. At the end of each chapter he formulates in a few lines his conclusion.

"International negotiation" he defines as "the process of consideration of an international dispute or situation by peaceful means, other than judicial or arbitral processes, with a view to promoting or reaching among the parties concerned or interested some understanding, amelioration, adjustment, or settlement of the dispute or situation." He emphasizes the increasing use of multilateral rather than bilateral negotiation, although there continues to be a place for the latter. Negotiation cannot be successful unless the parties genuinely want a peaceful solution of the problem, and their "irreducible minimum objectives, which must be distinguished from their maximum declared objectives, must not be totally incompatible." He points out, however, that objectives may fluctuate and an originally nonnegotiable dispute or situation may become negotiable after a lapse of time.

On procedures and attitudes facilitating negotiation he discusses the use of mediators, conciliators, and good offices tendered by outside states or international organizations; the role of the United Nations and international conferences; and the wisdom of the parties or others enabling them to perceive the optimum scope of such procedures at a given stage.

Factors which inhibit the success of a negotiation are the conviction by one party that it has the present or potential power to dictate a settlement, that it has commitments or alliances preventing compromise, and that the personal feelings of the head of state are involved. Concepts of nonnegotiable "vital interests," intrusion of third parties, and the conviction by both parties that they must negotiate from a position of superior strength may also inhibit negotiations. Contrary to common assumptions, especially by Marxists, that economic difficulties are at the root of conflicts, he finds that problems arising from commercial interdependence are usually negotiable and such interdependence in fact facilitates negotiation on other questions, as do requirements for eco-

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tal magnitude of the national economy. It is often cynically described as being necessary to keep the economy going and the society affluent. But this expenditure is now being used as an excuse to skimp and cut back on social programs of the so-called great society which could be quite liberally supported on annual expenditures of what we are pouring into Vietnam in one or two months. We have cornered such a large share of the world's resources that the choice for us as Americans is not guns or butter: it is one of even greater moral significance, napalm or a helping hand to the poor of this world, whether within or without our national borders.

Planning for this great waste of material resources gets the nearly exclusive attention of many of the world's greatest leaders. Problems of peace and the needed social adjustments to assure a constructive continuation of peace are being neglected, not only as to funds, but also as to the amount of attention they get from persons in authority.

This is the dreary present background against which we consider, in this useful book, the urgent problems of world education at the university level. Harold Taylor says in the foreword, "Full recognition of the necessities and possibilities of internationalism in cultural and intellectual affairs has lagged behind the facts of the world situation, and the world's educational system is presently in danger of becoming less, rather than more, internationalized as the political divisions and antagonisms multiply and coalesce into institutional forms." And he concludes: "It would therefore be greatly to the advantage of every country in the world not only to open up all national universities to a much wider variety of international students, faculty and curriculum, but to establishing in key points on the seven continents new institutions where the conception of the unity of mankind and the essential unity of man's knowledge can find expression in what is taught and what is learned."

Michael Zweig, who is research assistant with the Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics at the University of Michigan, has written a careful summary of the various proposals and efforts toward effectuating such proposals for a world university since

the idea was first broached at the end of World War I.

Many readers of the book will be surprised, as I was, to learn of the large number of proposals from leaders in many countries for world universities in various forms which were made and discussed during the period of the existence of the League of Nations between World Wars I and II. My own first interest in the subject came as a reaction to a speech given by former President Eisenhower at Stockholm in the summer of 1962 at a conference of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession. Apparently many people have made suggestions of this kind spontaneously and without knowledge of the prior history.

A proposal for a "University of the United Nations" was presented by the representative of the government of Colombia at the formative committee meetings in late 1945 which got Unesco established. A similar proposal was sent to the United Nations in November 1945 by an unofficial body of members of the American, British, and Italian armed forces who were stationed in Rome; three months later the Chinese delegation to Unesco petitioned its preparatory commission to include higher international education in the program, requesting that "a number of United Nations Universities . . . be established . . . at least one on each continent." This proposal from China also requested the establishment of a chain of United Nations Libraries and a great United Nations Translation Bureau on each continent to work on the improvement of translation services and the standardization of meaning of terms in various languages. Zweig traces in detail the various alternative proposals in the way of single-subject institutes that were also put forward for Unesco consideration and the stages by which action was delayed and nothing significant was done by that body. There is more than a hint that part of the inaction and inertia came from some of the existing universities, which opposed sharing available resources for support with new institutions.

Meanwhile, despite inaction by formal international bodies, a small beginning is being made in the establishment of the Friends' World Institute, which started operations with a pilot


project at a small, donated ten-acre campus in East Norwich, Long Island, New York. Although it started with an experiment in the summer of 1963, on the initiative of the New York Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, the "experiment had no formal relation to the Quaker religion; it was conceived as a model world college in which all religious philosophies shared equal status." The success of this experiment led to a plan for the Friends World Institute which already aims to have seven regional centers throughout the world, and which received its first students in September 1965.

The planners look forward to an eventual enrollment of some six thousand students at its seven campuses, and a program of travel-study by which students would spend part of their time at the various campuses. A travel-study program for high school students is also planned. At present the main emphasis is on undergraduate instruction, but graduate work and research can come later. World universities have been talked about for nearly 40 years; now from this small beginning may come a realization of what the world needs most in the area of higher education right now.

The fact of the Friends World Institute getting started by using abandoned Air Force barracks gives a modern touch to the biblical admonition to beat your swords into plowshares. The whole project could be easily put over by use of the crumbs from the military men's mess. The United States owns enormous properties in the form of bases throughout the world, many already becoming obsolete. Right now we have the problem of using property which cost us well over \$75 million in Paris, formerly used as the headquarters of Nato. The donation by our government of this and similar properties to the needs of a chain of world universities would go a long way toward assuring their establishment. All of the assets of the Friends World Institute have so far come from private donations and are still under \$1 million, the amount which our government spends on war in Vietnam every ten minutes.

*E. U. Condon is professor of physics at the University of Colorado.*

## COMMENTS



### IT'S TIME FOR SCIENCE TO ACT ITS POLITICAL AGE

In the first two decades after World War II, political good fortune—luck—came easily to the scientific community, and, as a consequence, science had neither the need nor the incentive to develop the political instincts and mechanisms commonplace in other segments of our society that are heavily dependent upon the good will, understanding, and largesse of the federal government. At the end of World War II, Vannevar Bush, the director of the civilian-run wartime research program, produced *Science, the Endless Frontier*. It was inspired by a desire to assure support as well as independence for American academic science, particularly from the military, which was suddenly eager to move in and subsidize anything that smacked of science. Implicit in *Science, the Endless Frontier* was an idyllic vision of a scientific community, generously supported by government but carefully insulated from it. As Bush saw it, Congress would appropriate funds for a science foundation, the President would appoint a board of distinguished scholars; they, in turn, would select a full time director who would be responsible only to them.

The only difficulty was that the political community gagged on this idea. Truman rejected it in 1947, pointing out in a veto message that the bill provided for the expenditure of public funds unaccompanied by any effective provision for assuring that the funds were being used in accordance with public policy. A compromise, weighted toward the Truman position, was adopted in 1950. With the Korean war under way the House, deciding against such luxuries as scientific research, cut out all funds for the newborn National Science Foundation,

but the Senate managed a slight reversal in the form of a \$225,000 appropriation.

Let us keep in mind that it was fear of the military that, in large part, inspired the NSF proposal. But what had happened while the NSF legislation was blocked? The Navy came along, entirely on its own initiative, and became a shadow NSF, pouring what were for that period extremely large sums into academic research. With few questions asked, no strings attached, and to the immense gratitude of academic science, the Navy became the principal subsidizer of science in the early postwar period. We can chalk that one up to the wisdom and generosity of the Navy and the good luck of science.

#### • MEDICAL RESEARCH

In the biomedical sciences, we once again encounter a large element of good luck. The incredibly rapid growth of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), starting around the mid-1950s, came about partly as a consequence of life scientists and their substantial federal investment in basic biomedical research would produce great benefits for the American people. The same argument could be and was raised in behalf of NSF—but failed to inspire any great flow of federal funds. Politically, the difference between the two agencies was a simple one. The peculiarities of congressional seniority had placed NIH's financial affairs in the hands of two men—Senator Lister Hill and the late John Fogarty—who, if anything, were committed to spending more money on medical research than, at times, even the NIH leadership felt could be spent well. Thus, harmonious and

fruitful relations with Congress developed easily, perhaps too easily—for the biomedical community. On the other hand, NSF's fortunes fell to a congressman, the late Albert Thomas, who did not share the scientific community's vision of NSF's place in the world. Thomas regularly slashed NSF's budget proposals. But there was always an easy way out: the military, eager to support science and establish ties with academic science, was willing to pay for research as a means of doing this.

Let us look at another field. By the end of World War II, the atomic scientists felt they had had their fill of General Groves and military management of research. But, while they fought the tangled battles of the May-Johnson bill, there was General Groves, sitting on a pile of money in the lame duck Manhattan Project, urging scientists to come forward with plans for building up a great new program of fundamental physical research. At the end of the war an advisory committee of scientists said that about \$40 million might be used to get things going. Groves gave them \$72 million, and out of this came the Brookhaven National Laboratory, the Argonne National Laboratory, and support for new accelerators at half a dozen universities around the country.

I don't wish to downgrade the difficulties or to overlook the great accomplishments in linking science to government. I do wish to emphasize that the linkage developed rather easily, not as a consequence of the scientific community exercising political muscle, but because the war had demonstrated the value of science and technology, and politicians felt that it was in the national interest for them to thrive. They had no sophisticated notions of the role of research in modern society; nor did they have any idea of the peculiar nature of scientific research. Rather, I think they took science largely on faith, feeling that research should be generously supported, whether through NSF or the military did not matter.

Now, money appropriated for reasons of faith has equal purchasing power with money appropriated for any other reason. The difference is the effect that these conditions of faith wrought upon the recipients of the



## FORUM

### EDUCATION FOR WORLD UNDERSTANDING

EDWARD U. CONDON

In the summer of 1962, former President Eisenhower gave a speech in Stockholm at a conference of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, in which he strongly suggested that all nations should join in establishing a "school for world understanding," and that the U.N. General Assembly should take this on as a project. He said: "World enlightenment will speed the day when the burdens of armament and the fear of others will be removed from the backs and hearts of men." He recommended that the school should be staffed with "an international faculty of scholars, whose concern would be objective truth, purged of national and regional bias, hatred, and prejudices."

I will not argue here the general merit of education. Instead I will applaud the Eisenhower proposal in its spirit and purpose, and say that I believe that a vast contribution—not a complete solution, nor panacea, but merely a vast contribution—can be made if we make a major expansion of education at the international level.

The only fault I have to find with Eisenhower's proposal is that he described something too small, and too narrow in scope, to be adequate to the real need. Nor was his proposal realistically related to our great ability to pay for a project so potentially beneficial to the welfare of mankind.

Eisenhower envisioned a school dealing only with world history, diplomacy, politics, international communication, and teaching. He proposed a student body of two or three thousand students taking a two-year course, presumably after completion of a normal four-year liberal arts college course.

Thus for the whole world he was thinking of a school, narrow in the scope of its subject matter, and about as large as one of the municipally-

operated junior colleges of our medium-large cities. He seemed to think his proposal might be regarded as burdensomely expensive, because he said, "However high the price of a school for global understanding might be, it would still be a minute fraction of the moneys now spent by governments against global war."

How true that is! Let us see how his project could be expanded to something like the proportions it ought to have, and how even after this were done it would still cost only a trivial fraction of what the world now spends to prepare for war.

Next year the United States will spend approximately \$56 billion on war preparations, adding together the Department of Defense budget and about half the budget of the Atomic Energy Commission which gives the bombs free to the Defense Department. The world expenditure per year is about \$120 billion.

Suppose we could get the governments in the U.N. to agree to pay to the U.N. a tax of one per cent of their arms budgets to support "schools of world understanding." This, too, would represent an investment in security, and a much better one both morally and practically, than one based on almost total reliance on indiscriminate mass bombing of whole populations. In this way we would have about \$1.2 billion a year to work with.

We who are in education are not used to thinking of sums like that. The operating cost of the most lavishly operated college that I know of, the Air Force Academy near Colorado Springs, is only about \$12,000 per student per year. With professional scholars instead of air force officers as professors, one could operate a much better college than the Air Force Academy at much less than half that cost.

Let us budget \$6,000 per student-year, which is lavishly high and totally out of line, especially with the amount needed in any of the underdeveloped countries. But using this figure, with only half our \$1.2 billion—or \$600 million a year—we could pay for the total costs of 100,000 students. Assuming four years of training per individual, our annual output would be 25,000 students a year who are especially trained for working on the front of international relations and development.

In the case of the well-developed countries, I would not propose the creation of new colleges and universities, but would recommend rather the appropriate expansion of the best facilities we now have. In the countries that are not now as well off as we are, I would propose to build a worldwide chain of major U.N. universities with the other \$600 million a year.

The capital investment in plant and facilities of a brand-new major university, one that offers undergraduate and graduate training in medicine, agriculture, and engineering as well as liberal arts and fine arts, is about \$100 million. These could not be built in one year anyway, so I would propose to start building about two dozen of them, spreading their construction out over about four years. Thus each one would require \$25 million a year for four years, and we could be building two dozen of them at once with the other \$600 million a year. If each of these would be planned to take care of a student body of about 10,000 students, in four years we would have modern capacity to take care of about 240,000 students. After four years we would not need nearly so much money for capital facilities, so we would have more money available to subsidize more students.

I think that Eisenhower is right: Although we can use quite a few well-trained diplomats in the years ahead, no such large stream needs to be let loose on the world. That is why I suggest that the schools of world understanding be expanded to deal with other specialized professions for which the world also has a great need of more well-trained men and women.

All this we could do with just one per cent of the present world's armament budget. All this we Americans alone could do by devoting to it less

than one fourth of one per cent of the gross national product. So let no one say we cannot afford it. Figures like these make the long, hard congressional debates over buying \$100 million of U.N. bonds look rather mean and silly.

This particular allocation of \$1.2 billion a year is not necessarily the best one, but it may help us visualize the magnitude of the possibilities when we are not used to thinking of education in terms of figures as large as one per cent of the arms budget.

When we Americans speak of educational cooperation, I am afraid that we usually have in mind some magnanimous arrangement in which we teach the poor unfortunates of this world who are not Americans all about the blessings that would be theirs if they only adopted our ideas, attitudes, and modes of behavior. An important part of the total plan suggested here would be to counteract this tendency by bringing to America as visiting professors a large number of the leading scholars of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, as well as of Europe, to teach in our colleges and universities. This is something that could be done to good advantage right away by one of the major philanthropic foundations. All of us would benefit immensely by establishing in our colleges a hundred or more such posts which could well be called "Listen Yankee Lectureships on World Affairs." Other similar exchanges are needed elsewhere, but it would be tactless to mention specific places where there exist centers of "regional bias, hatred, and prejudices" (to quote Eisenhower) that need a little purging.

Finally, let me say that it is quite possible that the detente which has followed the Cuban crisis and the Cuban treaty may well lead to the complete abandonment of a number of outlying military bases. Instead of just abandoning these properties, they provide us with a wonderful opportunity to get started at once with our schools of world understanding.

Our naval base at Guantanamo is on a property that is 45 square miles in area, on a beautiful location. Why not start the process of beating our swords into plowshares right now, by offering to transfer our interest in this base to U.N. auspices, for the purpose of establishing there a great U.N. univer-

sity devoted to the cultivation of the best interests of an alliance for progress in friendship between Latin America and the United States? I am confident that U Thant could win the enthusiastic cooperation of Fidel Castro for a plan by which Cuba would become the host to a U.N. activity making Guantanamo the intellectual and spiritual center for cooperation in this hemisphere.

Let me close by quoting the message of the great Czech educator, Jan Komensky, in his book, *The Angel of Peace*, published in 1667, in which he addresses himself to the English and Dutch negotiators working on a treaty to end a war between their countries. He charges them thusly, in a manner which might well serve as a charge to those who are entrusted with the larger negotiations in the more dangerous situation of today:

"And you, ambassadors of peace, that you may live up to your name, do not only consider human, but also divine plans; take account not only of what is asked of you by your kings, but

also what is asked of you by the King of Kings; let your aim be, not war, but peace. Do not write your agreements and treaties only on parchment, but also on your hearts; do not confirm them only with silver seals but also with the great name of God; do not take oaths in deceptive human language, but from the depths of the soul, which is witnessed and searched by God in virtue of that truth which is in Christ."

Let us hope that the time is not far off in which all of man's intelligence and creative spirit may be devoted to works of peace and that neither shall they make war any more.

*Edward U. Condon is professor of physics and fellow of the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics, University of Colorado. He was director of the National Bureau of Standards from 1945 to 1951, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1953, and is currently president of the American Association of Physics Teachers.*

## WAR, VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN NATURE

JUDD MARMOR

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HAROLD TAYLOR

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241 West 12th Street,  
New York, N.Y. 10014.

December 12th, 1967

Professor E. U. Condon,  
Department of Physics,  
University of Colorado,  
Boulder, Colorado.


DEC 18 1967

Dear Professor Condon,

I have just read your review of The Idea of a World University in the October Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and I am writing to say that it is a most intelligent and persuasive statement about the ideas in the book, and the best piece of writing in any review it has received so far. Claude Bissell, president of the University of Toronto, said the usual things about the international ideal for universities in a review in the International Journal - "I am doubtful," he said, "whether it is either desirable or possible for a university to cut itself off from its national roots." Since that is not what Zweig or I were arguing in the book, and in any case to cut off from national roots is a practical impossibility for national institutions already in motion, that kind of comment on the book does not help anyone very much.

You have captured the essential and I am delighted to read what you had to say. You may be interested in knowing that a group of fifteen of us, including Sam Gould the President of the State University of New York, and Oldrich Stary, Rector of Charles University in Prague, met in Rome last week for a planning session for a World Conference to be held at the University of Rome in January of 1969, to which we are expecting representatives from four to five hundred universities around the world, to tackle the problem of what the universities can do to internationalize their curriculum and throw their weight behind the forces of peace. The Russians, the Poles and the Czechs are collaborating, and are even going to put up some money from their governments to support it, as is the Italian Government and the University of Rome. It will be one of the few times when socialist and capitalist money mingles freely in a friendly way to make something possible which the whole world needs.

With very best wishes to you.

  
Harold Taylor

pp 155-156 *The Idea of a World University*  
by Michael Zweig  
Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1967

*Middle East Technical University (METU)*, 24 Mıdafa Caddesi, Yenisehir, Ankara, Turkey, provides an illuminating example of possibilities for future developments of the world university idea. The idea for METU originated in 1954, during a visit by Mr. Charles Abrams of the United States on behalf of the United Nations. Mr. Abrams originally suggested a School of Architecture and City Planning for Turkey; following the work of a UN Technical Assistance Mission in Turkey in 1955, the idea was expanded to include engineering and technological disciplines. With the help of UNESCO, a group of Turkish business, industrial, and educational leaders drew up a university charter which was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1959. In the beginning, only courses in architecture were available, but faculties in Engineering, the Arts and Sciences, and the Administrative Sciences were added, and the University expanded its concept in an international direction to serve the needs of the Middle East region rather than simply those of Turkey. "It is of incalculable value," says the METU catalog, "in building understanding between nations for students of different origins and backgrounds to work and mingle together." There are faculty members from twenty countries, an international student body of three thousand with plans for an eventual enrollment of twelve thousand.

In the beginning, METU received financial help from the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and now receives funds from the United States AID program, the Ford Foundation, CEN TO, and from "friendly foreign governments in the way of experts, equipment and books under bilateral agreements." The main source of funds is, however, the budget of the Turkish Ministry of Education. It is significant that the conception of a technical university should have expanded in the direction of including the arts and sciences, education and public administration, thus uniting technical and liberal studies through the demands of the region which METU serves. It is entirely possible that through expansion of the basic idea of a regional center for technical and social planning into that of a world center serving regional and world needs in the arts and sciences as well as in the technologies, the evolution of METU into a world university could take place.